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West Europe Report

(FOUO 24/80)



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WEST EUROPE REPORT

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THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES

FRANCE

COMMENTARY ON ALLEGED SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF CBR WEAPONS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 10-16 Mar 80 p 40

[Article by National Defense Studies Foundation president, General Georges Buis: "Afghanistan: Soviet Nuclear Escalation"]

[Text] Since the Battle of Poltava (1709), the Soviets have always acted as if they were convinced that wars are won by a superiority ratio of 3 to 1. In Afghanistan, they are confronted by an unexpected war. They will not negotiate until after they have won it. And quickly. They have therefore committed themselves there, insofar as concerns combat troops, on the basis not of 3 to 1 but rather 10, 20, 30 to 1. And if the report turns out to be true that they have deployed CBR [Chemical, Bacteriological and Radiological] weapons, it will mean that insofar as concerns heavy weapons their superiority there is in the millions, tens of millions to one.

Why? First, so as not to get caught in the toils of a colonial war, in which the advantages of guerrilla tactics are at least an even match against the greater sophistication as well as greater numbers of conventional weapons. And secondly, because the Soviet armored and mechanized divisions probably went "as is" into Afghanistan. The fact is that these divisions are organically equipped with a considerable array of artillery, consisting not only of cannons but also of 18 multitube rockets (40 rounds each) which are the normal vehicle for C and B weapons, and 4 missile-launchers (12 Frog missiles each) capable of delivering nuclear warheads at distances of 100-120 kilometers. This type of weapon is found in even greater numbers and higher explosive powers (Scud tactical nuclear missiles) at the "army echelon," an echelon that has been heavily hit by the Soviet engagement in Afghanistan. These ANT's [tactical nuclear weapons] have an explosive power of 5-180 kilotons (Hiroshima: 13 kt). Although land-mobile, they are not designed to cover Himalayan spurs. They are therefore found, of course, in rear areas, in and around cities and bases.

If the Soviets were to use them against defenseless people it might be considered good military tactics, but certainly also a plunge into the unknown. The nuclear Pandora's box will have been opened. Misfires or

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delayed ignitions could result in explosions on the ground, producing craters that would expose masses of radioactive dust to the will of the winds. The operation could no longer be confined to the Soviet-Afghan ambit. It will be the proof, for the entire planet, of a Soviet determination to open a new and terrifying era.

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COUNTRY SECTION

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

POST-AFGHANISTAN WEST EUROPEAN POLICY DIRECTIONS TOWARD USSR

Paris COMMENTAIRE in French Spring 80 pp 49-53

[Article by Jean Laloy: "Save Us From Our Friends"]

[Text] The crisis of the East is a grave one. As grave as the great crises of the past, those which threatened the basic equilibrium. It is grave for three reasons.

First, the manner in which it is presented in Moscow: a "foreign threat"; a series of "appeals" of the threatened government; a long Soviet resistance to temptation; finally the "assistance," the good Afghan people crushed in the loving embrace of the bear. Few had heard any mention of the American "threat" or Afghan "appeals." If the danger had been such, could the USSR not have addressed itself to Washington? In 1962 John Kennedy had placed the question of Soviet intervention in Cuba before the world. Why in the present case speak of alleged American intervention only as an afterthought and in such a confused way? Everyone realizes that with such arguments an armed intervention can be launched and justified anywhere.

But the second reason to take the affair seriously is that Afghanistan does not belong to the Soviet bloc, properly speaking. In the Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship of 5 December 1978, the USSR states that it "respects the policy of non-alignment" adopted by Afghanistan (art. 5). Here then is a vast field, especially the Near and Middle East to go no further, open to a type of assistance by armed intervention the real basis of which is the will of the stronger. It throws international relations into complete disorder.

Finally there is geography. Bordering on Soviet Russia, China, India, and Iran, Afghanistan is not the backyard of the USSR. On the world scale it is a little like what Czechoslovakia was in 1938, the geometric locus of intense opposing forces, a stage for ulterior actions. Two new possibilities for displays of "friendship" may be discerned on the map without difficulty: one may concern Pakistan, or more especially Baluchistan, and the other Iran on the occasion of one of the summersaults which it risks undergoing. Iran, wrote a Soviet author in 1919, is "the Suez Canal of the world revolution"!

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None of these facts can be unknown to those responsible for the Afghan operation. They know they are perhaps on promising ground, but inflammable. They are watching foreign reactions. What do they see? A lack of unity between Europeans and Americans, or rather between the European continent and the United States. In France, in LE FIGARO of 16 January, PM de La Gorce recommended rejection of economic sanctions or "vain gestures" like the boycott of the Olympic games in Moscow. One must be inspired by "national" interest, he writes. "Foreign policy is the domain of the pitiless."

Almost every day PRAVDA shows frightened Europeans in its cartoons, forced to accept a basket of Pershing II missiles from the hands of a monstrous American. It would be worth some reflection before invoking "national" interest. It would be well to ask oneself what the possible sequence of events may be before trumpeting the maxims of Grandpa's realism. The government is perhaps right not to act without examining the pros and cons. But one can believe that it sees its role as something different from sacred egoism.

The Soviet Union has always been on the horns of a dilemma, but especially since 1953: how to open to the world while still remaining closed? How to conduct a universal policy without exposing oneself to the influences of the universe? Stalin had a lock: the terror. Since his death the leaders, motivated by the instinct of self-preservation, have rejected absolute terror. They must all the more see to it that nothing moves.

But there are reasons for things to move. Of course the party and state apparatus is not complaining. But as soon as one leaves the special stores, the official apartments, the walled garden, one discovers many things. It is not that opinion is hostile to the regime. It merely asserts that it is not working. It tolerates the grayness, the lines at the shops, the cramped housing, the boring work, the crudeness of manners, the alcoholism, criminality, and a leaden press, literature and culture. But it no longer has faith. Socialism no longer has any attraction. If after such a long time, so many horrors, so many efforts it has provided only what one sees around one, how can one believe that some day it will provide more and better? Few moreover imagine that in the West the "working class" is crushed by the "big monopolies." There are enough travelers so that at least in the urban areas everyone gets an echo of the reality abroad. And this reality is quite plainly that a degree of socialism, that which is practicable in the ideas of the socialists, is more or less in the process of being achieved. Where? Well, in the so-called capitalist countries. But it is not the socialism of Lenin which the theoreticians, having exhausted adjectives, today call "genuine socialism." Hence the ideological revivals which occur periodically in the USSR, and especially in 1979. Hence the intensification of the sanctions against all those who have had enough of it. Hence the internal exile of Andrei Sakharov, the religious persecution, and the anti-Olympic precautions. How can one open up while remaining closed? By locking the doors. By allowing them to open in only one direction. From East to West.

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How then to influence the rest of the world?

State and Movement

Outside the Union and its empire, the Bolshevik leaders have long used two implements of action: the state and the movement. The state controls, organizes, negotiates, arms, and conducts trade; the movement and its branches act upon the masses, on the press, on the media, on pressure groups, beyond the frontiers of the state, throughout the world. The Soviet system, itself, remains closed. This is the principle of non-reciprocity. Like two wrestlers one of whom, namely ourselves, has one leg and one arm.

This situation is undergoing change. The primacy of the Communist Party of the USSR has been called into question. China has seceded. The national parties are balky (at least outside France). The Soviet myth has collapsed. Nothing will revive it in its initial form.

At the same time another world is appearing: the universality of the human species is revealed to all through the peril of universal destruction. Die for Leninism? What good is that if nothing escapes? Live for him? But everyone knows that progress itself is also a myth. The threats born of progress appear everywhere: excess of births here, scarcity there; exhaustion of natural resources; the stifling of culture by technology; uniformity, regimentation, and pollution.

The world of tomorrow has nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism and its Manicheanism: "Either us or them." It resembles rather what Paul VI was saying: "Never again some against the others."

Everything in the present world points toward the idea of a solidarity which is no longer ideal, but real, because, lacking it, all humanity runs the risk of perishing or wasting away. This is something which could ruin both fanatical ideologies and traditional compartmentations, policies which would like to be "pitiless."

"Peaceful Coexistence"

"Peaceful coexistence," the other name of which is "detente," is an attempt to avoid war without sacrificing Leninism. It must be imposed, it is applicable only to relations between states, and it leaves intact the very genuine means of action concealed behind the term "ideological struggle." This expression may include guerrilla movements, and finally the assistance rendered either to them if they are in the "direction of history" or, in the opposite case, to their opponents. As in Afghanistan.

"By its very nature," writes Mr Suslov, "detente consists of introducing into the practice of international relations the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence. The international recognition of these principles, especially

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by the great Western powers (...) is an historic victory, proof of the change which has taken place in the correlation of forces on the world scale."¹

Coexistence as a "victory," and a victory of "Leninism" is certainly not peace. It is victory without war. And our governments, including that of Mr Nixon, but also the French Government when it launched the formula "Detente, understanding, cooperation," had better give it a second look.

Coexistence is a struggle. It is an unequal struggle because it is based on non-reciprocity. It is not a hopeless struggle.

Two Factions

Under the great principles of Mr Suslov there are diverse tendencies in the USSR. Many, among the generations which have not known war directly, think of a slow evolution, permitting the growth of exchanges of all sorts and arriving little by little to a type of pragmatism compatible with an initial outline of tolerance.

Others, on the contrary, entrench themselves behind the radical difference between the Soviet system and all the others. For them "coexistence" is acceptable only if accompanied by great successes confirming the correctness of Leninism. Between the two one finds all kinds of shadings and mixtures.

Who decides? This is the necessity of the system. The more it ages, the more it closes in upon itself, and the more its external means of action go back to the use (direct or indirect) of force.² Ideological force? Declining. Economic force? Inadequate. Political force? Useful, but not always sure. Military force? Why not? But its management is dangerous.

It is therefore worthwhile to oscillate between detente, which opens, and tension, which closes, without excluding any means to secure, little by little, if possible unnoticeably, a definite, recognized superiority. First of all in the operational theaters bordering the USSR: Western Europe, the Near East, with its African and Asiatic extensions. This is the present phase. Beyond that, and according to the circumstances, it will be seen how to adjust relations with the United States, China, India, and Japan. According to the "correlation of forces." For the moment Europe and the Near East are in the forefront. They have been there a long time. Listen again to Andrei Sakharov:

¹ Report of Comrade M. A. Suslov To the National Conference of Ideological Workers, PRAVDA, 17 October 1972, p 2.

² "Sakharov is a good scientist," said Khrushchev in August 1961, "but let the rest of us run foreign policy. Only force and the ability to disorient the enemy count. We cannot say out loud that we are conducting a policy from positions of strength, but it has to be so..." A. Sakharov, "Sakharov Speaks," Paris, Seuil, 1974, p 34.

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"I often remember the following anecdote," he writes. "In 1955 a highly placed official of the Council of Ministers of the USSR declared to a group of scientists gathered in the Kremlin: 'Henceforth (...) we discuss the development of a new Soviet policy in the Near East. The long-term goal consists of using Arab nationalism to provoke difficulties in the petroleum supply of the European countries and thereby make them more compliant.'" ³

Have the words of 1955 lost their taste in 1980? Are we not "more compliant"? Are we not so for precisely this reason? Are we capable, as Europeans, of reacting as we should to Soviet force? If not, should we limit ourselves to encouraging the adepts of Islam to resist as well as they can?

At the moment when America is awakening, is the continent of Europe going to resign itself and doze?

Return to the Cold War?

If one recognizes that "peaceful coexistence," in the interpretation of Mr Suslov, is only a trick, is the "cold war" consequently the other term for the alternative? This is what many Western leaders have asserted recently. "Either coexistence or the return to the cold war." Here one must come to agreement on the meaning of the words. For the theoreticians of the Soviet Communist Party, the "cold war" is when the West resists without resorting to war. This is coexistence without war, therefore peaceful, but with a better balance of wills. Would this be a calamity?

But one can do better. One can rally opinion for the idea of a long term policy necessarily leading to an overall goal: recognition of a universal order of values above and beyond modern fanaticisms, coexistence for the purpose of peace.

It is not true that the Soviet Union opposes itself against the rest of the world because of the "difference of social systems." Who in our countries has difficulties in getting along with the Yugoslav regime? No one. But the USSR is not always reconciled with it. Who feels disturbed by the social system of China when (and as long as) Deng Xiaoping runs it? What stands in the way of peace is the claim of the Soviet system to be the only one called upon to resolve the problems of humanity. If it suppresses this term "only," it would be a great step forward. If it would cease to claim that any political system whatever has the ability to resolve everything, that would be still better. But this relativism is becoming increasingly widespread in Soviet opinion. It was a high official who in 1972 told Jacob D. Beam, ambassador of the United States in Moscow: "Ideology is stale bread." ⁴ No one eats it any more. And did not Khrushchev himself almost fall into the abyss of "revisionism"?

³ A. Sakharov, "My Country and the World," Paris, Seuil, 1975, p 79.

⁴ J. D. Beam, "Multiple Exposure," New York, 1958, p 294.

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The deployments of power which we are seeing today are a sign neither of adventurism nor of madness. They are a sign of a narrowing of the choice of means. The use since 1975 of Communist armed forces to advance the "liberation movement" in Indochina, in Africa, and in the East, is a noteworthy phenomenon. But, on condition that they do not encounter reasonable and determined resistance, these enterprises do not lead to war.

The coming year is full of dangers. Dramatic circumstances may come about. Everyone is discovering that without diversified, mobile, and powerful means of action, nuclear weapons are of little help in politics. Their presence nevertheless weighs down upon reflexes. Fear of them is the beginning of caution if not of wisdom. One can therefore cross this defile. One can even go further.

For this there are two conditions: a unity of views among Americans and Europeans, and a long-term policy.

A unity of views, and not a so-called alinement. The symbol is the business of the Olympics. The Western countries as a whole should refuse to go to Moscow. This will cost money, and annoyance. But it is without risk and it is not without effect.

Based on this unity various reactions according to the situations, of course, and also according to interests. Diversity is the characteristic of our system. It is wrong to present the Western alliance as a bloc. It will not become one today, any more than it was in 1966, when General de Gaulle, who had just "left NATO," proposed to Mr Brezhnev "the reestablishment of Europe in a fertile whole, instead of being paralyzed by a sterile division." ⁵ Unity must be regained above these diversities. It will be all the more solid as the general lines of a policy going beyond peaceful coexistence will begin to appear.

Beyond Peaceful Coexistence

One should begin by getting internal Western relations in order, especially in the economic and monetary fields.

One should examine the problems of defense, and the adaptation of internal and interallied structures to the new situation resulting from the globalization of military threats.

One should strengthen ties with the countries of the South, on condition that non-alinement is clearly distinguished from alinement with Fidel Castro.

What should be done with regard to the Soviet Union?

5 C. de Gaulle, "Discours et Messages," Paris, 1970, vol 5, p 43.

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Try to define a policy distinguishing the interests of this great country from its ideology. Envisage what sort of agreements might exist with a power of this size if it consents to act as a member of an international society in which it would recognize that it was par inter pares, equal to the others in rights and duties.

Publicize the general lines of this policy and draw the consequences from it, namely rejecting agreements which compromise it (especially disarmament agreements without real control, without a commitment to political and ideological toleration), and the policy which ruins it (like that of peaceful coexistence in the present sense), but trying to establish where possible understandings which defuse dangerous situations in the expectation of a real international order, to create, bit by bit, beyond ideologies, which are as voracious as they are unreal. Staking one's bet openly on an evolution of this regime, an evolution which is at the same time improbable and not impossible, until the day when it would cease to take itself for the god of history.

One will perhaps find these suggestions both vague and provoking. They cannot be set forth in detail here and could be only through deep collective labor. They are less provoking than the statements of the Soviet leaders on the inevitable ruin of the liberal regimes, what they call the "non-socialist world." Decoded: not yet [in italics] socialist.

No one has any interest in the explosion of a serious crisis in the USSR or in the countries forced into "socialism." One must therefore search for paths and means toward a slower evolution, corresponding to the deep desires of the masses, but also to the general security of the Russia of tomorrow in a world increasingly different from the idea (already false) which Lenin had of it almost a hundred years ago.

We are not yet there. If we wish to arrive there, three tasks must be done:

To define long-term political lines, leading, little by little, beyond coexistence, if not to peace, then at least to that toleration indispensable to avoid the worst.

To set forth in detail in the meantime and as a function of these long term goals, what can be negotiated usefully with the Soviet leaders, not without something in return.

Immediately: to thwart the maneuver which tends to chloroform Western Europe and to establish a dominant influence over large sectors of Asia and Africa.

And thus find new breath.

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The Russians and Europe

"The Russians play their role very clearly. They present themselves as friends of peace and arbiters of Europe...In sum, they are informing us that Russia wants to intervene in the affairs of Europe, but that Europe is not to interfere in those of Russia."

K. Marx, letter to Engels, 10 May 1866
(WERKE, Vol 31, Dietz, Berlin, 1965
p 216. Translation by Kostas
Papaioannou.)

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COUNTRY SECTION

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

EXPANDED MACHINERY EXPORTS TO PAY OIL BILLS

Hamburg CAPITAL in German Apr 80 pp 211-214

[Article: "Wishful Objective"]

[Text] The costly oil imports are eating up foreign trade surpluses. The hope to avoid deficits rests on the engineering industry. The future barter trade calls for swapping modern technology for oil.

Those who in the seventies lacked the words describing the difficult economic situation and political climate needed only to look up the reports and presentations by managers of the Association of German Engineering Institutions (VDMA) who complained how badly off their industry was--and to their great chagrin saw themselves also promptly tagged as the nation's spoilsports.

At the threshold of the new decade the behavior of the prophets has undergone a change which, while not sudden, was nevertheless qualitative. Bernhard Kapp, manager of the Werkzeugmaschinenfabrik Kapp & Co (Machine Tool Works Kapp & Co) at Coburg in the Upper Palatinate says: "The engineering industry faces the future with confidence."

Kapp's optimistic assessment is not based solely on the assumption that German entrepreneurs will in the future spend more on machinery. Rather, he relies much more on the prospect that, in spite of the momentary unfavorable investment climate prevailing abroad, orders will start coming in shortly, primarily from the so-called developing countries, countries which are on the threshold of industrialization.

And in fact a large part of the hope which our economists harbor is based on a conservative forecast of increased machinery exports. The bill which the Federal Republic had to pay oil producing countries last year has indeed made a big dent in our foreign exchange holdings and wealth.

The German balance of payments shows a deficit of 9 billion marks for the first time in 14 years. The foreign trade surplus was cut almost in half

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from 41.2 billion to 22.5 billion marks. This was due primarily to the increase in the cost of crude oil; the prices for mineral oil products rose so exorbitantly that the Federal Republic's total oil bill rose within 6 months by half to 48 billion marks.

Over the past decade the increase in the price of energy reduced considerably the quantity of oil which the FRG received in 1970 in exchange for the same quantity of export goods. At that time, a medium price automobile costing 9,000 marks was equivalent to 147 tons of oil. By 1979, the value of this car, whose price rose in the meantime to 15,850 marks, had shrunk to a third of the above quantity of oil, to 48 tons. For purposes of comparison, in 1970 a basket filled with merchandise worth 10,000 marks still bought 163 tons of crude oil. Last year the identical products, whose price in the meantime rose to 15,200 marks, were equivalent to only 46 tons of oil.

The engineers also complained that the 50-percent rise in export prices was wholly insufficient to keep pace with oil prices which since 1970 rose by 440 percent.

In spite of the past persistently pessimistic forecasts and balances of the industrial sector of medium size structure, the hope that this industrial branch with its high export potential will eliminate future German balance of payments problems is absolutely justified. Hardly any other industrial branch has managed to survive every postwar recession like the engineering industry, with somewhat ruffled feathers to be sure, and still find the courage to overcome the next output hurdle. And hardly a year has passed without reports of new output and export increases--even though the entrepreneurs always reckoned up losses in profits. The reasons why the engineering industry became the backbone of the German industry are many:

--The trademark Made in Germany has retained its good name in the world in spite of price increases;

--German technicians with their undaunted spirit of inventors have always managed to bring to world markets new products superior to those of their competitors;

--German enterprises concentrate increasingly on deliveries of complete plants and systems which only technologically well-equipped companies are able to offer;

--The industry has succeeded in obtaining easier terms to finance exports in order to counter the heavy subsidies granted in other countries.

The export credit interest rate set in the past by the EEC countries, which could not be exceeded, was always a source of irritation in the past. Now the member states have agreed to charge differentiated interest rates. German exporters, who had to charge their customers higher domestic market interest rates because subsidizing of interest rates for export by the state was forbidden, were at a disadvantage because various countries with weak

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currencies paid their exporters the difference between the interest rate set by EEC and the interest rate prevailing on the domestic market; in France, for example, the issuing bank subsidizes the higher export credit interest rate. However, this is not the only problem which the engineers must overcome. The biggest among the industrial branches with an annual turnover of 105 billion marks and more than a million employees is fragmented into 4,000 companies producing 14,000 different products. A mere 4.4 percent of all enterprises with more than 1,000 employees account for about half the entire output of the engineering guild.

In view of the high proportion of highly skilled workers among their labor force, the companies pay some of the highest wages in the world. The self-capitalization potential of the companies is chronically weak and in the past 10 years profits have decreased markedly.

The entrepreneurs have always been trying to balance their domestic difficulties by increasing exports. Already in the middle of the sixties the export of engineering products accounted for more than 40 percent of production and thereby a fifth of all German exports. While today more than 60 percent of the products are being exported, the proportion of the engineering industry in total exports has not risen markedly. Still, the fight for world markets has rather hardened the German exporters of engineering goods. Before the end of the year, Tyll Necker, member of the board of directors of VDMA proclaimed proudly: "Those who doubt the productive capacity of the German engineering industry are overlooking the fact that this industrial branch has always made the best of its opportunities, no matter where they presented themselves."

And in fact, in the coming year these opportunities can again be exploited to good effect. Thus, the large engineering enterprises Gutehoffnungshuette, Thyssen Industrie and Klockner-Humboldt-Dentz (KHD) have already booked many foreign orders. For 1980, the VDMA expects the volume of export orders to increase by 9 percent.

This is the more astonishing since, according to BDI (Association of German Industries) calculations, the entire German industry was already in 1979 incapable of making up the losses caused by the enormous oil bill. The so-called trade recycling remained a theory because oil-exporting countries played a waiting game with their demand for German machinery. But VDMA President Bernhard Kapp is undaunted: "As the pacemaker in modernization and restructuring, the engineering industry has good prospects." He and his colleagues count on:

- an economic policy markedly more favorable to capital investment;
- stimulation of investment by energy cost increases;
- increasing need of industrial countries to modernize;
- rising demand for capital investment goods by developing countries;

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--high technical productivity of the enterprises and adaptability of the medium-sized enterprises.

If Kapp is right and if his fellow workers do not fail the VDMA technologically, then the engineering branch faces the task of helping its country out of the oil squeeze by the prescription of Baron Muenchhausen who extricated himself from a swamp by his bootstraps.

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What the German Engineering Industry Plies a Lively Foreign Trade With

The engineering industry comprises 33 specialized branches with differing export potential. Listed are branches with the largest past export volume--which are viewed as technically advanced--and those with the smallest.

a Fachweize	b Maschinenarten (Beispiele)	c Export		d Produktion		e Import		f Steige- rung in Prozent
		1968	1978	1968	1978	1968	1978	
		in Mill. Mark	in Mill. Mark	in Mill. Mark	in Mill. Mark	in Mill. Mark	in Mill. Mark	
1	Antriebstechnik	766	2818	368	6342	225	949	352
2	Prüfmaschinen	75	277	368	438	284	9	21
3	Fördertechnik	911	3313	364	6053	286	136	538
4	Bau- und Baustoffmaschinen	1195	3806	318	2756	5819	390	1326
5	Lufttechnik	754	2321	308	2057	4799	303	799
6	Pumpen/Verdichter	883	2542	288	1659	4335	261	240
7	Apparatebau	782	2198	281	1205	2329	193	67
8	Nahrungsmittel-/Verpackungsmaschinen	1268	3505	276	2010	4923	245	177
9	Armaturen	635	1733	273	2089	5168	247	213
10	Holzbearbeitungsmaschinen	511	1392	273	720	1721	239	34
11	Büromaschinen	1513	4012	265	2652	7262	274	1154
12	Bergwerksmaschinen	316	829	262	815	2820	346	45
13	Präzisionswerkzeuge	399	979	245	1217	2942	242	124
14	Landmaschinen	1436	3351	233	3323	7056	212	302
15	Gummi-/Kunststoffmaschinen	653	1522	233	1134	2452	216	86
16	Kraftmaschinen	1111	2566	231	1888	5014	266	273
17	Hütten- und Walzwerkeinrichtungen	404	926	229	521	1348	259	43
18	Industrieöfen	240	525	218	377	704	187	29
19	Textilmaschinen	1303	2809	216	2137	3205	150	253
20	Waagen	113	239	211	255	670	263	11
21	Gießereimaschinen	149	308	208	171	543	317	36
22	Werkzeugmaschinen	2423	4991	206	3550	7713	217	306
23	Druck-/Papiermaschinen	1531	3044	199	2095	4373	209	171
24	Maschinenbau insgesamt	21136	54117	256	42056	93287	222	5085
								16383
								322

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Key:

- a. Specialty manufactures
- b. Types of machines (examples)
- c. Export
- d. Production
- e. Import
- f. Increase in Percent
- g. In million marks
1. Motive power technology
2. Testing machines
3. Mechanical conveying and handling technology
4. Construction and building material machines
5. Air engineering
6. Pumps and compressors
7. Manufacture of apparatus
8. Food packaging machines
9. Fittings
10. Woodworking machines
11. Office machines
12. Mining machines
13. Precision tools
14. Agriculatural machines
15. Machines for the rubber and plastics industries
16. Motors
17. Metallurgical and rolling mill machinery
18. Industrial furnaces
19. Textile machinery
20. Vehicles
21. Foundry machines
22. Machine tools
23. Printing and papermaking machines
24. Total for engineering industry
25. Gears and couplings
26. Testing installations
27. Cranes, elevators
28. Dredges, concrete mixers
29. Freezers
30. Compressors
31. Cooling towers, chemical plants
32. Breweries
33. Valves, manometers
34. Saws and grinding machines
35. Typewriters
36. Drilling tools
37. Milling tools
38. Tractors, combines
39. Mixing installations, mixers
40. Motors, turbines
41. Cold rolling mills, blast furnaces
42. Oil and gas furnaces

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- 43. Weaving machines
- 44. Tractor-trailer-, tanker-truck scales
- 45. Turner's lathes, power presses
- 46. Rotary printing
presses

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

PCF SEEN WEAKENED BY RUMORS OF MARCHAIS' PAST

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 4 Apr 80 pp 67-68

[Unattributed article: "The French judge Marchais"]

[Text] The "1943-1944 affair"--the Communist Party is battered and the image of its secretary-general is deteriorating.

The disclosures by L'EXPRESS a month ago on the mysterious past of Georges Marchais aroused extraordinary interest. That applies both to public opinion and to political circles. But one question remains: what might be the effect of the polemic which followed it?

To answer that question, L'EXPRESS requested a public opinion survey from the Louis Harris-France institute (see below). The results enable us to draw four conclusions.

1. Marchais did not convince anybody.

That is the main lesson to be learned. In spite of the protestations to the contrary by the Secretary-General of the Communist Party, only 22 percent of the French were convinced by his rather embarrassed explanation regarding his conduct during the war. Worse for him, 29 percent of the communist sympathizers have no opinion and 9 percent do not believe him.

These results confirm those of the survey conducted by Public S. A., published on 25 March by LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS, in other words, 54 percent of the French at that time believed that Marchais had not told them the whole truth. This contradicts the statements of the Communist Party according to which Marchais would benefit from the "affair."

2. Marchais' image is negative.

After Chirac and Mitterrand, Louis Harris-France and L'EXPRESS, in addition to the questions published later on, subjected Marchais to a test of qualifying adjectives. His shortcomings--"sectarian, lacking in

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tolerance" (59 percent), "violent" (53), "subservient to the Soviet Union" (53)--outweigh his positive qualities--"concerned with people" (50), "honesty" (50), "patriot" (38), "competent" (34).

Here again, the verdict of the communist sympathizers is worrisome for Marchais: only 57 percent think that the descriptive term "subservient to the Soviet Union" is incorrectly applied to the communist leader; 14 percent feel that he did not tell the truth and 16 percent expressed no opinion on this subject.

3. The French do not feel sufficiently informed to judge on the basis of the facts.

Although they are generally convinced that Marchais is hiding from them his past record during the Occupation, they do not want to come up with any opinions on the background. In spite of the Augsburg document, in spite of the total absence of any evidence furnished by Marchais. Did the latter return to France in 1943, as he says, or did he stay in Germany until 1944? Only 13 percent of the persons questioned (and 43 percent of the communist sympathizers) believe in the story Marchais told; 9 percent feel that he lied.

This is a lesson for the French press. Public opinion does not have the habit--as in the Anglo-Saxon countries--of "investigative reporting." Very quickly, instead of continuing to deal with the facts, the debate was diverted. By the Communist Party, of course. But also by certain majority circles who see in Marchais' bugaboo their best combined target for the presidential election.

How could the French not have been troubled by finding that, quite often, Gaullists and Giscardians, the habitual champions of anticommunism, quickly came to the assistance of the Communist Party's secretary-general? Especially since the assault launched by LE MATIN on another obscure period in Marchais' life--his sojourn in Moscow--furnished the Communist Party with an escape hatch. In disclosing the presence of the secretary-general at the Party School at the end of 1955, the Paris daily likewise hunted down the truth for him. But what a windfall for the Communist Party: one historical "gap" drives the other one away! It is certainly annoying that Marchais' biography does not mention his training course in the USSR. This at any rate is less serious than the mystery about Marchais during the period of 1943-1945.

4. The French do not like the past to be stirred up.

Especially regarding the troubled time of the Occupation, 50 percent feel that "it is not very important to know what today's political leaders did

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at that time." But 40 percent are of the opposite opinion. One out of every two French citizens thinks that a newspaper should not publish documents which "can make trouble for a political leader because of his past behavior." This behavior seems to them to be in the domain of private life rather than public life. That is a rather astonishing concept of democracy according to which the more power a man has, the less is he to be held accountable.

In other words, the French are conservative, even when the maintenance of the established order benefits an opposition leader. Two remarks are in order here: young people between the ages of 18 and 24, higher-level management personnel and self-employed individuals as well as socialist sympathizers are in favor of having politicians make a clean breast of their record. On the other hand, people between 50 and 64--those who, like Marchais, were young during the war--the small shopkeepers and craftsmen, the Giscardian voters, are in favor of maintaining silence--and that silence very often only helps lies rather than the truth.

Marchais--The L'EXPRESS-Louis Harris Public Opinion Survey

1. The past

Do the explanations given by Georges Marchais, regarding what he did during the war, seem to you to be:

Convincing	22%
Not convincing	38%
No opinion	40%

Do you think that George Marchais remained in Germany until 1944 or that he returned to France in 1943?

Remained in Germany	9%
Returned to France	13%
No opinion	78%

Which of the following two opinions is closest to what you think?

Georges Marchais must agree to have a commission of inquiry study his personal behavior during the war	17%
--	-----

Georges Marchais must not accept this commission of inquiry except if it also looks into the behavior of other present-day political leaders during the war	61%
---	-----

No opinion	22%
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2. Open-book candidates

What are the elements you would like to find out concerning each of the candidates for the office of President of the Republic (the total comes to more than 100 because of multiple responses.)

Their program	87%
Their past	20%
Their financial status	17%
Their health	14%
Their private life	6%
None of these	3%
No opinion	3%

Which of the two opinions below is closest to what you think?

The war has been over for thirty-five years. It is not very important to find out what today's political leaders did at that time.	50%
--	-----

Even 35 years after the end of the war, it is important to know what today's political leaders did at that time.	40%
--	-----

No opinion	10%
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In your opinion, the behavior, during the Occupation, of an important present-day political leader is:

A private matter of concern only to him	45%
A public matter concerning all French citizens	45%
No opinion	10%

3. Consequences for Communist Party

After certain newspapers challenged Georges Marchais on his conduct during the war, do you think that the position of the Communist Party in French public opinion is

Very much weaker	7%	50%
Rather weak	43%	
Not weakened	26%	30%
Stronger	4%	
No opinion	20%	

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4. Role of the press

If a newspaper has documents which may constitute a challenge to an important political leader because of his personal conduct in the past, do you think that its function is

To publish them	41%
Not to publish them	49%
No opinion	10%

This public opinion survey was conducted between 24 and 29 March 1980 among a sampling of 1,000 persons representative (using the representative sampling method) of the French population from the age of 18 on up.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

LEFT UNION SEEN SURVIVING LOCALLY

Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 14 Apr 80 pp 32-33

[Article by Andre Lesueur: "The Middling Left"]

[Text] The evaluation is somewhat positive--this is the conclusion of the socialists about the union of the left which in town halls is surviving the divisions at the parties' headquarters.

Drawn up by the PS [Socialist Party] leadership, this evaluation comes at midterm, 3 years after the municipal elections of March 1977 when 184 cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants came under the control of town councils having a socialist, communist and radical left majority.

The analysis is based on a representative sample of 85 communes. In 55 of them, relations with the elected communist officials were considered good by the elected socialist officials. In 19 instances, they were deemed average and bad in 11 cases.

The principal criterion for evaluation was the vote on the budget.

The national agreement of 28 June 1976, in which the parties of the left decided to present a joint list of candidates, in fact obliged future elected officials to respect "management solidarity." In the first place, this means a united vote on the budget.

In many municipal councils of the union under socialist leadership, communist elected officials have, on several occasions, rejected this solidarity, either by voting against the budget or by abstaining. In most cases, they thereby intended to oppose the increase in local taxes. This is a way of applying locally the policy of rejecting the austerity, as decided at the PC [Communist Party] summit. It is a way, too, of competing demagogically with their allies, in view of future elections.

This has been the case, since 1977, in Saint-Priest, then Dreux, Angers, Meaux and, on 31 March 1980, at Brest. In all cases, the socialist

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mayors reacted immediately--they deprived their communist assistants of their powers.

In other cities where the principle of management solidarity was saved in the end by a united vote on the budget, relations were nonetheless strained and make day-to-day administration difficult. Thus, at Rennes, the socialist mayor, Mr Edmond Herve's hands have been tied since the autumn of 1979 because of two profound disagreements about municipal policy--one on the construction of a communal slaughterhouse, the other on cultural policy.

At Lille, without deliberately causing a break, the communist elected officials are now engaging in non-participation: they are not taking their seats on the municipal commissions, even those which they head. This inspired the ironic comment of Mr Mauroy, the socialist deputy mayor in October 1979: "It is true that we hardly ever see the PC municipal deputies and advisers. They are fleeing. What do we do about runaway children? We await their return, like that of the prodigal son...."

At La Roche-sur-Yon, in Vendee, where the atmosphere between the former allies is getting worse, the communists have taken the middle road: they voted against certain items in the budget presented by the socialist mayor and approved the others.

La Roche-sur-Yon, Angers, Brest.... Relations are much more strained in the municipal councils in the west. On the other hand, they are considered very good in the Nord -Pas-de-Calais and fairly good in the east, Le Poitou-Charentes and Rhone-Alpes.

"Riposte," the PS daily, remarked on Wednesday: "For the past 18 months, the Communist Party apparently wants to destabilize the union in the municipal councils headed by the socialists in the large cities in the west."

In the regions where the left has long been established (as in the Nord-Pas-de-Calais), even if the competition was fierce in the past, the socialists and communists have their fiefs, and the security of one guarantees that of the others.

In the recently acquired west, on the contrary, positions remain fragile and the balance of power could change. The partners thus base their thinking on the idea that, by outmaneuvering the other, they are improving their position for the future elections.

The weight of the past, notably of trade union struggles, is added to this competition in the west. Socialist gains in this region are especially supported by the CFDT [French Democratic Confederation of

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Labor.] Now, relations between this Christian-affiliated confederation and the communist-leaning CGT [General Confederation of Labor] have always been disastrous in Brittany. Moreover, the west is one region where the autonomous line toward the PC, as advocated by Mr Michel Rocard, meets with the approval of the socialist militants. This explains the exacerbation of tensions between the former partners of the joint program.

On several occasions, the violence done to the union within the municipal councils of the left has revived the polemic at the parties' headquarters. Noting various departures from management solidarity, the FNESR [National Federation of Socialist and Republican Elected Officials] Congress, controlled by the PS, decided in November 1979 on the systematic withdrawal of authority from any communist elected official who did not vote for the budget presented by a socialist mayor. Mr Marchais replied to this on 26 November: "Solidarity of management does not mean and never has meant unconditional support for a policy which has not been approved by the voters and is contrary to their interests."

More recently, commenting on the decision of Mr Francis Le Ble, socialist mayor of Brest, to take away the powers of his communist assistants, "Humanity" wrote on Monday, 7 April: "Never, to this day, has a communist mayor deprived one of his socialist deputies of his authority, much less his mandate."

Indeed, in the two cases of municipal councils under communist authority (Le Mans and Reims) where the socialists refused to approve the budget, no sanctions were taken against them.

Contrary to what is happening at party headquarters, it seems that the communists are more devoted to the union within the municipal councils than the socialists.

The latter feel they were tricked in 1977 when they opened wide the doors of their town halls to allies who the following year kept them from obtaining power. They are thus inclined to be more severe toward their partners and some socialist mayors, with the current state of division in the left, are even thinking of going it alone in the 1983 municipal elections.

The communists think differently. In the municipal councils which they control, the addition of some socialists or leftist radicals gave them a democratic guarantee, without making them lose one speck of power.

It should be stressed that the socialist elected officials in municipal councils under communist management (Bourges, Le Mans) almost always complain about not being included in important decisions. One conflict

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became so bad in Reims that the first socialist deputy criticized the communist mayor for monopolizing the communal apparatus to the PC's benefit. However, no matter how acute the tensions are, the communists do not want to lose their guarantee.

In the socialist municipal councils where they are participating, the communist elected officials claim to want to avoid bringing national quarrels to the local level. This is the result of a subtle balancing act. On one hand, they wish to distance themselves sufficiently to make the socialist mayor bear the blame for increased local taxes. On the other hand, they show enough solidarity to keep the foundation which will allow them to enlarge the breach in the socialist fief.

In this sense, taking away authority is a sanction feared by the PC; it deprives them of all means of action. Thus, at Saint-Priest and Dreux where communist elected officials were so punished, they made honorable amends and regained their powers.

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COUNTRY SECTION

FRANCE

'L'EXPRESS' WRITERS ON EFFICIENCY, ABILITY OF NEW SPYMASTERS

Paris L'EXPRESS in French 22 Mar 80 pp 104-110

[Article by Yves Cuau and Hesi Carmeli: "The New Spies"]

[Text] Of what use are the CIA's sophisticated instruments, if the CIA can neither avert the Iranian crisis, nor the Afghan crisis? Who currently directs the world services, and how? Yves Cuau and Hesi Carmel open up the files.

Christmas 1979: two Soviet motorized divisions crossed the Afghan border and sped southward. At Langley, in the Washington suburbs, Admiral Stansfield Turner, chief of the CIA, humiliated and furious, finally discovered the reasons for the movements of the Red Army. For 3 weeks, the CIA's satellites and its monitoring stations had closely watched, with extraordinary precision, the displacement of the smallest of Russian units. False conclusions were drawn.

On 17 November 1979: A German, quite undisturbed, returned from an inspection tour in the sixth governorship of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, a region strictly barred to foreigners. Three days later, hundreds of Moslem very well armed "fanatics" stormed and captured the great mosque in Mecca. The costly observation satellites had not noted anything suspicious in the desert.

In January 1979, the Americans knew everything about Iran. Up to the last moment, they did not believe in the victory of the Islamic revolution. The Khomeyni operation and consequences had not been integrated into the brains of the CIA computers.

It is possible to know everything about a country, and to not understand anything about it. To photograph objects the size of a tennis ball and to be totally unaware of the intentions of the adversary. To wastefully spend billions of dollars, when the eyes and ears of a good observer would suffice to grasp what is essential. Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia: three crises that highlight the great debate between HUMINT [Human Intelligence] and ELINT [Electronic Intelligence].

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HUMINT is intelligence provided by an agent on land. ELINT is electronics (electronic intelligence). A few figures as a point of reference: 50 percent of CIA intelligence is derived from electronics; 40 percent comes from "open" sources (books, newspapers, technical manuals); 5 percent is provided by HUMINT; and the remainder comes essentially from foreign services that share their intelligence with the United States. The total budget for American electronic intelligence exceeds 50 billion francs a year (satellites, monitoring stations, reconnaissance planes). But in 30 months, from January 1977 to September 1979, the CIA did not carry out more than 3 special operations (covert operations) abroad. It is true that, since the invasion of Afghanistan, the "Company" has obtained the green light for six covert operations that no one would have dared imagine a year ago.

An outstanding example of ELINT failure: Iran. At the end of 1978, the American computers were crammed with intelligence details. All of the officers were known; all of the opponents were recorded. The radio monitoring posts were functioning admirably; the movements of tanks or planes were immediately recorded. The Shah was safe from any surprise action. The Americans knew everything. All, except the essential part: that the army would not fight; that it would become scarce during the upheaval, and that the cassettes recorded by an old ayatollah had already sealed the fate of the empire. The Israeli "diplomats" of the Jewish agency, who all speak Farsi and who frequent the bazaar, had already realized that. The French suspected it. But Fleishman, chief of the CIA antenna, who relied with such conviction on electronics, his hundred agents in Tehran, and his three secret bases in Iran, did not know it. He does not speak Farsi, nor do most of his men, and their real objective was the monitoring of the Soviet Union.

For Admiral Turner, it was a horrible surprise. This 57-year old career officer, classmate of Jimmy Carter at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, inherited the agency in February 1977, under difficult conditions. The congress had taken exception to Ted Chaikin Sorensen, former special adviser to President John Kennedy, who was suspected of active leftism.

Over a period of 2 years, Turner dismissed more than a thousand employees--civilian and military. He intended to restore order to an establishment that had been totally paralyzed since the end of the Vietnam war and the downfall of Richard Nixon. But the method that was chosen was surprising. It was a computer, fed with the personnel folders of all case officers, that gave a verdict without appeal. The admiral refused to go beyond the judgment of the machine and, as in a famous case cited by Michael Ledeen, editor in chief of the WASHINGTON QUARTERLY and one of the best intellects at the Georgetown Center for Strategic Studies, one of the most competent case officers of the CIA--"having direct contacts with a good number of chiefs of state and of government"--was purely and simply dismissed for incompetence.

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The agency has been under strict congressional supervision since the Church Committee's investigation in 1975. Eight congressional committees have the right to review its activities: 204 persons (163 congressmen and 41 public employees) are obligatorily informed of the least of its operations. This complicated situation is complicated even more by the personality of the admiral. "He thinks of himself as being in the role of Humphrey Bogart in 'Caine,'" said one of his assistants.

The Langley Strawberries

He is entrenched in his seventh floor office, where visitors arrive directly by means of his personal elevator: there, everything is peaceful and luxurious; thick light tan carpeting; a splendid view of the Langley Forest, on the outskirts of Washington. Turner often offers his guests filet mignon and strawberries. His fondness for this fruit is so great that, on 15 January 1979, an impertinent person placed a funny lampoon on the service table. The false note was signed "Turner" and charged that "his" strawberries had been stolen. It ended thus: "Naturally, I will keep you informed of the progress of the investigation. There are good odds that this dirty informer, this dirty crypto-dog, this mad strawberry fiend will end by recognizing his error and giving himself up. I would bet my admiral's pension on this. I regret having to do that, but national security is the business of those who are involved, and not of puny weaklings."

More seriously: the turbulent democratic senator from New York, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, said: "All that one does in the Langley offices is to carry out research--research that could just as well be done at the Library of Congress."

Poor admiral. He tried to react in August 1979 by publishing some advertisements in the WASHINGTON POST and the NEW YORK TIMES, in which the CIA publicly offered, for the first time in its history, some "interesting positions for men and women who have a sense of adventure." There were 2,300 letters in reply and about 100 applicants were given favorable consideration.

He also created a section for the research and analysis of the physical and psychological behavior of foreign leaders (Lapierre and Collins did not invent anything in "Le Cinquieme Cavalier" ["The Fifth Cavalier"]). This new department made some thick files on Menahem Begin and Ezer Weizmann available to Anouar Sadate, but above all it lost hundreds of hours in analyzing all the documents that came from Moscow in order to be sure that Leonid Brejnev had not been replaced by a double when the foreign visitors were welcomed at the Cheremetievo airport. A comendable concern this combination of HUMINT and ELINT, but one that did not prevent another Waterloo, even more serious than the Iranian debacle: the invasion of Afghanistan.

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On 4 December, the telephone rang in the home of Richard Lehman, chief of the "alert office" in the division of analysis and research of the CIA (National Intelligence Division), directed by Robert R. Bowie. Created a year before by Admiral Turner, the mission of this office is to evaluate all intelligence related to a risk of confrontation with the USSR. That day, the duty office in the operations room on the seventh floor at Langley headquarters announced the arrival of corroborative and serious intelligence. An observation satellite, Big Bird, that passed over the Soviet Union every 90 minutes and took photographs over the Indian Ocean, detected a big operational CP [Command Post] and observed the movements of several divisions at the Afghan border. Another satellite, KH 11, marvel of marvels that transmits its intelligence directly to the CIA by means of a relay station located in Australia, was positive: its computer memory, that makes it possible to compare its photos with those of the night before, indicated an abnormal traffic over several airfields. Finally, additional intelligence noted the arrival of two Soviet infantry battalions on the military base at Bagram, 45 kilometers from Kabul, entirely under Red Army control.

"Plumbers" in the Embassy

But what conclusions were to be derived from this intelligence? There was uncertainty for more than 3 weeks concerning Moscow's actual intentions. The monitoring of radio-telephone communications between vehicles of the principal Kremlin leaders had no longer been giving any results for a long time. After a few imprudences committed at the time of the delivery of these gadgets, they were mistrusted and used only to exchange banalities.

The bewilderment became even more intense as a consequence of a classic operation of poisoning. Some American "plumbers" succeeded in putting microphones inside the Soviet embassy in Washington. It is the rule of the game between the great and the less great. But it was later learned through a defector that the mikes had been detected in October 1979. And the "red-faced persons" did not protest until 14 January 1980, after having held several reassuring and false "secret conferences" on the situation in Afghanistan for approximately 4 months. From 4 to 26 December, there were only three rather moderate notes addressed to Moscow to express "American concern." No real formal White House warning.

The man who had duped Admiral Turner is a thorough professional: Youri Andropov, chairman of the Committee for USSR State Security (KGB). The only chief of the "Guebe" since Beria to become a lawful member of the Politburo. One of the possible successors to Leonid Brejnev. His neighbor who lived on the same floor and his friend.

He is not a bloodthirsty brute, like many of his predecessors. A Western diplomat who knew him in Budapest described him as a cultivated man, interested in modern art, capable on occasion of a touch of humor. But he was

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ambassador in the Hungarian capital at the time of the terrible repression in 1956. This "apparatchik," who speaks English well and who has succeeded in some instances in acquiring the reputation of being a moderate, is a master of international subversion and a specialist in poison operations. In May 1967, his first brilliant coup after his appointment as head of the KGB was to persuade Nasser of the imminence of an Israeli attack against Syria by furnishing him--through the intermediary of his agent, Sami Sharaf, who had gone to almost the top of the Egyptian State apparatus--a false report prepared by the Soviet counterintelligence services: the "Neeman Document," named after the former No 2 man in Jewish Army Intelligence.

It was Andropov who personally directed the well-known Department D (for counterintelligence) charged with poisoning abroad). One of his specialties: the forging of increasingly more sophisticated American official documents. Some examples:

1975: The false American Army Manual, reference F 30 31 B, bearing the signature of General William Westmoreland. This document, which aimed at accrediting the idea that the United States intervened systematically in the domestic affairs of their allies, circulated in about 20 countries.

1976: A false telegram from the Department of State, a distorted version of an authentic but anodyne message to show that the United States was trying to suborn some European officials in order to obtain confidential national intelligence. Same year: a series of completely forged telegrams in order to embitter Greek-Turkish relations and to weaken NATO's flank.

1978: A false report on paper with a NATO letterhead and bearing the signature of Joseph Luns, secretary general of the organization. The text explained that it was a question of "punishing" a certain number of journalists who were against the neutron bomb.

1979: A letter on official paper of the embassy of the United States in Rome to confirm rumors spread by the KGB, according to which the Americans were stockpiling biological and chemical weapons on the NATO base near Naples.

2,000 Russian Agents in the United States

And it was a false defector of the KGB, nicknamed "Fedora," (the affair is still classified) who completely "misinformed" the Americans on an alleged Soviet delay regarding these special weapons. Result: General George Keegan, former chief of American Air Intelligence, today told L'EXPRESS that several Soviet war ships, like the KIEV, the KHARKOV, or the MINSK, are equipped with rockets containing toxic gases and equipment that

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make it possible for them to very quickly contaminate enormous surfaces. Another expert confirmed that all first line units of the Warsaw Pact are equipped with chemical weapons and decontamination equipment. In 1973, the Israelis were horrified to find significant quantities of military gas abandoned by the Syrians on the Golan heights. CIA experts think that some of the materiel was tested against some anti-communist resistance fighters in the mountains of Laos. They also think that some Soviet units in Afghanistan used chemical weapons.

Since 1970 Youri Andropov has also personally supervised (and not in the capacity of chief of the "Guebe), the super-secret covert operations service that maintains contact with various terrorist groups and that often manipulates them without their knowledge. The budget for this section is directly supported by the Politburo, and its funds are circulated through a complicated circuit of Lebanese, Swiss, and South American banks, in order to leave no trace. No one has ever been able to prove the existence of an actual "Soviet connection" between Andropov's men and those of the terrorist, Carlos, of the Japanese Red Army, or of the Baader-Meinhoff group.

Andropov travels little. He is too well-known, and directs a machine that utilizes electronics resources and the services of tens of thousands of employees, of "moles" [covert agents] and of "sleeper" agents, encysted in all countries--friends or enemies--of the world. The CIA, according to reliable American sources, today has no more than six truly clandestine professionals throughout the entire immense Soviet Union. There are more than 2,000 Soviet agents in the United States, several hundred Russian agents recorded in the city of Paris alone, distributed among the embassy, the consulate, Aeroflot, and various commercial organizations. The British were able to expel 105 diplomatic spies in one fell swoop after the revelations of defector Oleg Lyalin, without causing very strong protests in Moscow.

Institute 205

Another of comrade Andropov's sources of strength: support from numerous foreign services, chiefly those of East Germany. Their chief, Markus "Misha" Wolf, is at the same time Andropov's favorite and his best disciple. He is the only Jew at the head of an intelligence service in the East. Also, at 57 years of age, he is the senior member of the corporation. In what other country was an important person in intelligence appointed to his post at 32 years of age and then remained in it for a quarter of a century, through all crises?

Some former neighbors of the Wolf family, found by L'EXPRESS in a kibboutz in northern Israel, remember young Markus Johannes as a child of great intelligence who was fond of the theater and the cinema and wanted to

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become an actor. His father, Friedrich, was one of the favorite doctors of high society in Stuttgart. Erich Lehman, who now lives in Israel, speaks of him as a sort of Robin Hood, who charged high prices of the rich and who cared for the poor free of charge.

Doctor Wolf, a Jew and a communist, author of hits ("Cyankali," "Le Matelot de Cattaro," "Professeur Mamlock"), left Germany in time, in 1933, with his family. For France and Switzerland first, later for the Soviet Union, in 1935. Markus became "Misha." After French, which he spoke well, he learned Russian and English in Moscow. He went to Comintern schools: Kuschnarenkovo and Institute 205 in Moscow. He returned to Berlin in 1945 in a Soviet uniform with the "Ulbricht group," at the very moment when young Herbert Frahm, better known as Willy Brandt, returned to his native country in a Norwegian army uniform.

Germany, zero year. "Misha" became a journalist, known as Michael Storm, before becoming, at 29 years of age, the No 2 man in the central espionage bureau of the Secretariat for State Security: the all-powerful HVA.

His brother, Konrad, was appointed at the same time as president of the Academy of Art in East Berlin. Markus henceforth was a man without a face.

It was Werner Stiller, an HVA agent returned by the West Germans, who one day identified him almost by chance from a photo taken by a man in Swedish counterespionage who was planted in front of a building rented by the East German diplomats in Stockholm. He was arriving from Helsinki with his third wife and a passport in the name of Dr Kurt Werner.

Markus Wolf is 1 m 85 tall, blond, athletic looking in spite of his 57 years, and walks with his left shoulder a little lower than his right one. According to Stiller, he has a sense of humor and his men are very fond of him. He has the reputation of never abandoning them in a nasty mess, and of always trying to rescue them in case of arrest. He sends them coded messages on their birthday. Contrary to his friend, Andropov, he travels about a great deal throughout the world.

For example, on 17 November 1979 he was at the governmental palace in Aden, one of the world's hot spots, for the signing of a treaty of friendship between the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Democratic Republic of Germany. He was in the background, behind Erich Honecker and Abdel Fattah Ismail. Smiling, always slightly stooped. Invisible in official photos.

Three days later, during the night of 20 November, several hundred men belonging to several Moslem countries took possession of the great mosque in Mecca, the holiest of Islamic places. The leaders, the tough ones, were

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brought inside the super-secret base of South Yemen, located in the vicinity of Huf, in the sixth governorship, a region barred to foreigners. A base that was inspected the night before by Markus "Misha" Wolf. The destabilization procedure of the "Wahhabite" kingdom had begun.

Covert Agent in the American Senate

Those are the most recent activities of the man who had succeeded in infiltrating his agent, Gunther Guillaume, into the immediate entourage of Chancellor Willy Brandt and who has at least 50,000 agents distributed among all West German society circles. In many African capitals, HVA men supervise security and broadcasts. With its 17 million inhabitants, Red Prussia is the holder of a gold medal for activities linked with undercover war.

It was probably "Misha" Wolf's reputation as a super-manipulator of "covert agents" that won him the Soviet green light "to activate" James Frederick Sattler as a young and brilliant applicant for a position in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American senate; Sattler is the son of a good family from New England. Recruited during a trip to West Berlin, he was assigned the mission of causing himself to pass as a "hawk" member of the Atlantic Council Organization. Unmasked after Stiller's defection in 1976, he was fired by an important senator. He was able to take refuge in East Berlin, by going through Mexico, after a naive attempt by the FBI to have him returned.

And West Europe, in the face of conspiracies? It is experiencing many difficulties. The West German Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) is in a crisis situation. The networks of the celebrated Reinhardt Gehlen behind the iron curtain are on the way to natural extinction. The "Grey General's" agents are retired or dead, as is their former chief. Gherard Wessel, son of a very strict minister, had never really succeeded in becoming the head of the Pullach bureau. Klaus Kinkel, in his post since 1 January 1979, is a smiling jurist and a chubby man of 43 years, who went straight from foreign affairs to intelligence. He has yet to assert his authority, and his men devote their main energy to fighting against Markus Wolf's infiltrated men.

James Bond's Chief

The British maintain their traditions. The identity of the sixth chief since World War II of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), known also by the initials of MI 6 (Military Intelligence Department 6), is a secret in London: he is Sir Arthur Temple Francks, distant successor of Sir Dick Goldsmith White (better known as "M," James Bond's chief) and direct heir of Sir Maurice Oldfield, the legendary, chubby, pince-nez Smiley de John Le Carre.

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The SIS--known also as the "circus"--has had some painful problems with "covert agents" during recent decades: Philby, Burgess, Mac Lean, and, more recently, Sir Anthony Blunt, an internationally renowned historian of art and the queen's personal advisor. But the reputation of the "circus" is on the upswing now. Noblesse oblige: the Afghan borders belong to British tradition, and Sir Arthur, an expert on the East, was stationed in Tehran in 1953, at the time of Mosaddeq's downfall. The men of the SIS seem to have recently effectively brought a halt to the activities of the chief of the KGB "in residence" in Islamabad, V.I. Gurgenev, a dynamic young man who speaks Bengali and Urdu well, and who concerned himself too much with the tribesmen of the Khyber Pass, to the satisfaction of the old readers of Kipling.

One may however consider, without an excess of chauvinism, that there is only one strong man in West Europe in the field of intelligence: Count Alexandre de Marenches, director general of the French Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service (SDECE). A sort of Porthos, whom his employees respectfully address as "Monsieur le Directeur general" in his presence and, behind his back, "le Mahousse." A clever reference to Berurier de San-Antonio.

In 1970, when he was appointed by Georges Pompidou, this giant who is 1 m 90 tall and weighs more than 100 kilos posed a painful enigma to the "SDEK" detectives, who rushed to the social register. It was known that he had much money, many Anglo-Saxon friends (his mother was an American and his wife, Scotch), that he frequented the Jockey Club, and that he was an interpreter and aide-de-camp of the late Marshal Juin. The rest was a mystery.

The Waltz [Reshuffling] of the Chiefs

An indolent boyhood at the Rotoirs chateau, in the department of Eure, with a few months of schooling in the famous Roches school. In 1939, according to malicious gossipers, he flunked out of the reserve officer cadets corps because of poor spelling. In 1942, he joined his mother in Tangiers, by way of Spain. As a result of Juin's old friendship for Marenches' father and Marenches' excellent knowledge of English, Marenches became a perfect liaison officer.

In 1945, he was a reserve lieutenant in the cavalry. How did he become a colonel; after what periods and what stages? Still a mystery. One knows only of his ties with Colonel Fayolle, a veteran of Army Intelligence, who became chief of the SDECE service. During the period when some of his Rotoirs chateau neighbors continued to refer to this giant with the little black mustache, whose activities seemed limited to horseback riding and to travelling, as the "big imbecile," General George Marshall, American secretary of state, wrote of him: "I know him well. He is an exceptional man who has a rare knowledge of world affairs."

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That is the person charged by Pompidou, on the advice of Pierre Messmer, to restore order to an establishment upset by the struggles of clans, the Ben Barka affair, drug trafficking, a gloomy history of fake photos and some betrayals. An apparently almost impossible mission. The SDECE is a mille-feuille [layered puff pastry] in which all the successive governments since the liberation have left a layer. The military detest the civilians, and vice versa, and the Americans have been convinced, since Thyraud de Vosjoli (chief of station in Washington) asked them for asylum, that the "punch and Judy Show" was a den for "covert men."

An eclectic and worldly easy going person, the count of Marenches? Those who sneered were soon to understand their error. There was an immediate waltz [reshuffling] of the chiefs of service, a series of brutal shelvings, a modernization of methods, a return to compartmentation. Contrary to any recourse to hierarchy, the "DG" often relies on his psychological adviser, Dr Becuau, a doctor who rarely practices medicine.

While five directors succeeded each other as head of the CIA, paralyzed by the Watergate scandal, the "ZDEK" carried off some dirty tricks. For example, in Africa the French very precisely reconstituted the whole logistical chain of Soviet and Cuban aid on the black continent.

The operations service, essentially composed of Algerian veterans, specialized in manipulation ("manip"). An old strong conviction: a land operation makes no sense if it is countered by an adverse campaign of misinformation. Therefore the "barons" who were trained in Cercottes, in the vicinity of Orleans, adopted the methods of their adversaries. It was a series of French "manips" that compromised the Oeillets revolution in Portugal and facilitated the arrival to power of the moderate right. In July 1977, a French team, with the full agreement of Sadate, provoked a series of incidents at the Libyan border in order to try to put an end to Khadafi. The Israelis warned the Rais that "Libya's madman" was going to try to have him assassinated. The operation failed because of Egyptian Army delays and the brutal reaction of the Soviets, who in a few hours organized a special air service between the Crimea and Benghazi.

Colonel Alain de Gaigneron de Marolles, long-time chief of the operations service, is a man who is characterized as having "good horse sense, support, and luck." He now is No 2 in the SDECE and his appointment to the post of director of research poses some problems. Many of his men followed their chief, leaving a disorganized service to his successor, "Georges," called the cowboy, an efficient, but less subtle, person.

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Castafiore's Jewels

Alexandre de Marenches travels everywhere in the greatest secrecy, and had tremendous fits of rage when a minister of the interior had the presumption to seem conversant with his movements. He often travels in the company of his wife, disrespectfully called "la Castafiore" by the young aides-de-camp whose mission it is to supervise the suitcase containing her jewels--a suitcase into which "the director general" does not hesitate to slip his coded messages for help and gadgets. Too bad for anyone who might forget the suitcase! But it did happen once, fortunately in a country that was deemed friendly.

In Paris, this man who never appears in public, plays a significant role. He reports only to the president of the republic, regularly convenes ministers, French ambassadors, a certain number of newspaper directors, and directors of big enterprises. He informs them of the threats that weigh against the interests of France and of the "impressions" gathered directly from Peking, Washington, Tehran, London, Bonn, Rabat, Riyadh, etc.

He likes to offer a book written in Chinese in the year 500 BC: "The Art of War," by Sun Tzu (Flammarion edit.), that he prefers by far to the works of Clausewitz. One can read this sentence in it, that he sometimes quotes to his visitors, while showing them the big map, decorated with little red flags, that covers a panel in his office, furnished with English furniture: "If an enlightened prince and a discerning general defeat an enemy, if their realizations are extraordinary, it is thanks to advance intelligence."

The "Ideal Web"

Another huge gourmand friend of his says of him: "He is the French Kissinger." The judgment of an expert, stated by General Vernon Walters, former military attache in Paris, personal interpreter of several American presidents and former No 2 man in the CIA.

A French minister, and not least among them, relates: "He is crazy. He dared to summon Soviet Ambassador Stephane Tchervonenko, accompanied by the KGB resident in Paris, to his office in the Mortier barracks, and caused an angry scene and told them not to go beyond certain limits. The strangest thing is that Tchervonenko never protested. But what a scandal that could have caused!"

The minister doubtless simply forgot that Tchervonenko, normalizer of the "Printemps de Prague" [The Prague Spring], and friend of Andropov, normalizer of Hungary, was perfectly capable of understanding nondiplomatic language. Maybe Marenches also read him another sentence by Sun Tzu that

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day: "Five kinds of secret agents are used, that is: native, domestic, double, "liquidable," and temporary. When these five types of agents are all at work simultaneously and no one knows their procedures, they are called the "ideal web" and they constitute the treasury of a sovereign."

To disentangle the "ideal web" woven by the new spies is the work of covert men, who exert a good part of the world's real power.

COMPARISON OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS

Soviet embassy in Paris (including commercial, cultural, military, etc.	543	French embassy in Moscow (including commercial, cultural, military)	49
Embassy of Bulgaria	86	Embassy in Sofia	28
Czechoslovakia	102	Prague	36
GDR	150	East Berlin	35
Hungary	78	Budapest	34
Poland	130	Warsaw	65
Romania	70	Bucharest	35
Yugoslavia	129	Belgrade	39
Cuba	75	Havana	12

COMPARISON OF CONSULAR REPRESENTATIONS

Examples:

Soviet Consulate in Marseilles	26	French Consulate in Leningrad	6
Polish Consulate in Strasbourg, Lille,, Lyons	31	in Krakow	5
Yugoslav Consulate in Lyons, Marseilles, Strasbourg	32	in Leningrad	6

MEMBERS OF THE COVERT SERVICES

All of the Soviet defectors or those of the countries of the East unanimously declare that the number of members of the Covert Services in the official diplomatic corps of the countries of the East amounts to at least 50 percent of the total personnel.

There are about 700 employees from the East, legally in France, who in reality are regular members of the Covert Services of the countries of the East.

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The same defectors also add that all those who are not members of the Covert Services are obliged to accord complete support to these members. This refers only to residents, that is, those under diplomatic cover. To that must be added the "illegals" who live in France under clandestine cover.

OFFICIAL BUILDINGS

The French diplomatic corps in the countries of the East for the most part are located in buildings that do not belong to France.

Espionage by means of various technical procedures can easily be carried out in them.

This is not the case for any diplomatic corps of the East in France. For the USSR in France, in addition to the enormous embassy bunker, the Soviet diplomatic corps possesses:

- The La Ferte chateau (Seine-et-Marne)
- The Albarros villa in Deauville.
- The Brunoy chateau (Essonne).
- The Peupliers chateau in Montsoult (Val-d'Oise).
- A rest center near Mantes-la-Jolie, etc.

THE AMERICAN ELECTRONIC NETWORK

The extraordinary electronic spy apparatus that covers the entire planet answers to the "classic" needs for the collection of intelligence: radio communications interception posts, interception satellites capable of monitoring and of sorting a million telephone and radio conversations. Observation satellites, such as the KH 11, transmit their photos directly to the CIA operations center in Langley and detect objects the size of the palm of a hand.

But the vital function of the apparatus is that it serves to give a nuclear warning. Composed of three elements (satellites, radars, spy ships), this apparatus, through several intermediaries (for example, at North Bay, Ontario), leads to NORAD (North American Air Defense Center), a CP in a hollow excavated under the Cheyenne mountains in the state of Colorado. It was in this nerve system that the red light was lighted on 9 November 1979, at 1050 hours. The NORAD computer indicated that the United States was being threatened by about 10 nuclear rockets launched from Soviet submarines that were to attain their objectives in 14 minutes.

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Three hundred and 60 seconds after the indicated warning, the NORAD computer recorded: "Sorry, error." The electronic mistake had been corrected by the electronic system, itself. The special United States presidential plane did not even have time to take off.

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COUNTRY SECTION

ITALY

OFFICIAL FIGURES ON ECONOMIC SITUATION FOR 1979

Milan CORRIERE DELLA SERA in Italian 1 Apr 80 p 11

[Article by Anna Bartolini: "Automobiles the Definite Leader in Italian Consumers' Goods; Record Italian Figures for Luxury Goods in 1979"]

[Text] There was a notable increase in Italian consumer goods in 1979: a 5.1 percent increase in quantity compared with 1978 and 5 percent of the gross domestic product [GDP].

Parallely prices increased an annual average of 14.9 percent and the monetary expenditure for national consumer goods was 20.8 percent. These are the first figures in the chapter, "Family Consumer Goods," of the general report on the economic situation of the country that was issued, as usual, at the end of March.

The 1979 data confirm the theory of Ernest Engel's law, which says that with an increase in the financial means of families there is a drop in the percentage allotted to alimentary goods. The quantity of the latter in fact increased only 2.6 compared with last year's +2.8, while there was a notable increase in the allotment for nonalimentary consumer goods (+6.3 compared with the 1978 increase of 2.9).

Last year 76.8 percent of the available gross income was thus allotted to consumers' goods (public and private), while savings instead amounted to 23.2 percent (also an increase, compared with the 22.5 percent recorded in 1978).

Some observations should be made in addition to the statement of figures: the accelerated increase in prices that occurred at the end of 1979 make the prospects for 1980 appear to be extremely negative. The effect of the slowdown that is inferred from weighing the end of 1979 along with the entire year is extremely great and is thought to be about 8.6 percent.

"Even if there were no additional collateral effects for 1980," says Professor Quirino, who handles the national accounting data of the ISTAT

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[Central Statistics Institute], "in normal periods another 8.6 percent must be added, which would bring us to an increase in prices amounting to 17.2 percent at the end of 1980"--this obviously only in the optimistic hypothesis that no special phenomena are added during the current year.

The amount of increase in consumer goods causes some preoccupation. The increase is among the greatest in recent years, even if, taking into consideration the increase in population (+0.3 percent), the actual per capita increase is 4.8. Also of concern are the monetary increases of consumers' goods (+20.8 percent), higher than the +19.5 increase from work.

Among alimentary consumer goods, there has been an unprecedented increase in the quantity of soft drinks (+12.2). The increase was only 0.6 in 1978. Also higher were milk, cheese, and eggs (+3.9), fruit and vegetables (+3.4), oil and fat (+3.3), and meat (+3).

A particular increase is also found in the sector of nervine drinks (coffee, tea, cocoa), attributed in great part to a decrease in prices (-3 percent compared with 1978).

Significant among nonfood consumer goods was the increase in tobacco (+8.7), in spite of considerable price increases. But automobiles were in absolute first place among Italian consumers' goods in 1979: a +14.9 percent increase in purchases, with an 18 percent increase in prices and a 35.6 percent in value. To this is added another +7.3 for operational expenditures (+26.9 percent in value).

This confirms a great increase in parking lots, that had been almost frozen in 1978. Particularly accentuated was the registration of foreign automobiles, which in 1979 represented 40 percent of the total. Also significant was the approximate 10 percent increase in the recreational sector, owing to a boom in motor boating and to continued color TV and Hi-Fi purchases.

To be taken with some reservation instead are the data that have to do with hotels and public operations, where the 7.6 increase seems completely underestimated, as may be inferred from the recent tax evasion investigation conducted by Minister Reviglio.

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Distribution of Economic Resources

Totals	Absolute Values (millions of lire)			Variations (percent)	
	1977	1978	1979	78/77	79/78
At Current Prices					
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	190,083	222,369	268,868	+17.0	+20.9
Importation of Goods and Services	46,519	52,559	70,407	+13.0	+34.0
TOTAL	236,602	274,928	339,275	+16.2	+23.4
Domestic Final Consumers' Goods	150,294	176,265	212,462	+17.3	+20.5
- Family Consumers' Goods	120,329	139,708	168,803	+16.1	+20.8
- Collective Consumers' Goods	29,965	36,557	43,659	+22.0	+19.4
Gross Fixed Investments	37,203	41,494	50,289	+11.5	+21.2
- Construction and Public Works	21,090	24,038	29,017	+14.0	+20.7
- Machines, Equipment, Means of Transport	16,113	17,456	21,272	+ 8.3	+21.9
Change of Supplies	3,477	3,073	7,945	-----	-----
Exportations of Goods and Services	45,628	54,096	28,579	+18.6	+26.8

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